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The question of the nature of party government has only recently begun to
attract serious attention. This is surprising, given the importance of parties, not
just in liberal regimes, but also in many authoritarian systems. This state of affairs
is now changing. Thanks in particular to the work of R.C. Katz in the 1980s, there
is now greater awareness of the fact that there are many types of party-
government and indeed that there are dimensions according to which different
types of party government can be classified1.
By following the direction indicated by Katz, one can begin to determine
both the factors (institutional and behavioural) which account for the existence of
a particular type of relationship in a country and the fields in which or the planes
on which this relationship takes place. The factors which account for the
existence of different types of party government are the institutional arrangements
and in particular the presence or absence of a rigid separation of powers system,
the party system, the party structure and especially the degree of centralisation
and of cohesion of parties, and the character of the leadership, including the
existence of a split between party and governmental leadership. There are three
planes or fields on which the relationships take place. These relate to matters of
appointment, both of ministers and of members of party elites, to the distribution
of patronage, and, above all, to the elaboration and implementation of policies2.
While the planes on which government-party relationships take place are
distinct, they are also linked. For instance, parties press for ministerial
appointments at least in part in order to achieve policy results as well as to benefit
more easily from patronage; patronage and policy-making also seem likely to give
rise to trade-offs. The links may not always be obvious in practice; nor is the
direction of the linkage necessarily the same everywhere. Thus parties may press
for ministerial appointments and for policies simultaneously but independently,
without having to obtain one (appointments) in order to achieve the other
(policies). Moreover, even when links exist, they may be general and not specific:
while some appointments may be made in order to ensure that particular policies
are carried out, others may be made simply to keep an eye on governmental
policy overall. At the limit the relationship between the two elements may be so
broad that the link becomes truly tenuous. Only a detailed empirical investigation
can therefore reveal the precise extent of the links between the three aspects of
government-supporting party relationships; as such an empirical investigation
should take place in a comparative perspective, however, the aim of this paper is
to examine the forms, directions, and importance of the links which can be
expected to exist.
THE FORMS OR TYPES OF LINKS BETWEEN APPOINTMENTS,
PATRONAGE, AND POLICY-MAKING
Appointments, policy-making, and patronage distribution can be linked
theoretically in three different ways in a pairwise manner; in practice, however,
five different types of links need to be considered as some situations have to be
distinguished from others in terms of their origins and of the chronological
sequence of the linkage. Links between appointments and policy-making  are thus
of three types: first, parties may put forward the name of ministers in order to
ensure that certain policies are subsequently carried out; second, ministers may
nominate or influence the nomination of top party men and women in their parties
in order to reduce the chances of internal opposition within these parties; and,
third, parties may be prepared not to demand seats in the government in
exchange for policy concessions.
The fourth type of link relates patronage to appointments. As parties and
not governments ask for favours, the only linkage which can exist in this respect
is the one which relates favours made by governments to appointments made in
the government at the behest of the parties. The link between appointments and
patronage is also of one type only: it is basically a trade-off between the
government, which wishes to see given policies adopted, and parties, which wish
to obtain favours.
We already noticed that the links may be so general that they are almost
non-existent. Assuming that they are sufficiently specific to be regarded as
building a chain between parties and governments, these links can be
distinguished in three ways. The first distinction concerns the actors who are
involved. In one of the five cases, the exchange relationship takes place primarily
between the parties which support the government: this occurs when some of
these parties are more interested in seeing the policies which they advocate
being carried out than in having seats in the government: they exchange one type
of benefit (policies) for another (participation in the government). In the other four
cases, on the other hand, the link is between the government and the supporting
party or parties.
Second, the links also differ in terms of who initiates the move, which may
be the party or the government. When ministerial appointments are made by the
party in order to achieve certain policy results or to facilitate the distribution of
favours, the link is party-led; when the government influences top party
appointments or when patronage is distributed in order to smooth up the passage
of some governmental policies, the link is government-led.
Third, the links differ in their basic character: in two cases, the link takes
the form of a trade off; in the other three, one element depends on and follows
sequentially the other. The link between policy-making and patronage is based on
an exchange; so is the situation which occurs when a party refrains from joining
the government to achieve certain policy results. On the contrary, the other forms
of links establish a chain: appointments by the parties or the government lead to
policy decisions and, in the case of ministerial nominations made by the parties,
to patronage distribution as well.
GENERAL HYPOTHESES ABOUT THE LINKS BETWEEN APPOINTMENTS,
PATRONAGE, AND POLICY-MAKING
On the basis of the general characteristics of institutional arrangements,
party systems, party structure, and party leadership, a number of hypotheses can
be formulated as to whether links will be found among the three aspects of
government-supporting party relationships and how these links will be shaped.
First, it is hypothesised that interparty trade-offs in which a party refrains from
joining the government in exchange for certain policies will occur only in limit-
cases, as they are based on the assumption that parties are prepared to forego
exercising power, admittedly in exchange for some policy outcomes. These cases
will tend to occur where the party structure or the party system have unusual
characteristics, for instance where the whole political elite is tends to be
egalitarian or when when small parties or independent members give support to a
government composed of representatives of one or more large parties.
Second, it is hypothesised that party-led links -ministerial appointments
made by the parties in order to achieve policy results or in order to obtain
patronage advantages (or both)- will occur in situations in which the parties are
strong enough to be able to impose their wishes on the government and yet also
feel that they must remain on their guard as they are in a relatively hostile or at
best highly competitive environment. Both conditions have to obtain as, if parties
are so strong that they dominate the scene, they will achieve appointments,
patronage, and policy results without needing to link one (policy results or
patronage) to the other (appointments). These links will therefore tend to exist 1)
in coalition governments with no truly dominant party, 2) in single party
governments if the party is divided into clearly defined factions, or 3) in single
party systems or dominant single party systems if the party views itself as
surrounded by hostile ‘non’ or ‘anti-party’ elements against which it needs to be
‘vigilant’, a situation which has typically characterised many Communist systems.
Conversely, such party-led links between ministerial appointments and policy-
making and/or patronage will tend not to develop 1) where a single party majority
government fights, in a united manner, a strong opposition party, 2) where a
single party minority government relies on the external support of other parties, or
3) in presidential governments, unless the president is a rather weak compromise
candidate among a number of parties.
It is hypothesised that government-led links will emerge in two different
kinds of situations. Links between party appointments made or proposed by the
government and policy-making are expected to occur when a relatively strong
government is confronted with a cohesive party, but a party which is sufficiently
lively and therefore distinct from the government to be able to generate opposition
to the executive within itself as, otherwise, the government would not need to
influence appointments to ensure that its policies are carried out. Such a situation
will arise therefore 1) in single party majority governments or 2) in coalitions in
which one party is dominant or 3) in presidential systems in which there is a
single, dominant, or at least cohesive majority party which is not merely the
puppet of the government leader, however. Thus the link between appointments
made in the party and policy-making may exist in both authoritarian and liberal
systems. It exists in authoritarian systems in which a charismatic or personalised
leader exercises great influence on the party but does not dominate it entirely: it
therefore takes place more often when the leader inherits a party than when he
creates it. This link may also exist in liberal systems in which the parties have a
large popular support but where party competition has an ‘adversary’ rather than
a consociational character and one party normally wins the election outright, as is
typically the case in Britain and many Commonwealth countries. Victory at the
polls by a party means that the whole party leadership group becomes the
government: while, in a sense, the party ‘appoints’ the government in such a
situation, it is more realistic to describe this case as a transfer, en bloc, of the
leadership group to the government: the party leadership as such disappears2.
However, as the government is anxious to see its proposals accepted, it typically
uses its influence to ensure that any new party leadership subsequently put in
place will support government policies: ministers will therefore endeavour to
control party appointments though the link may often be general rather than
specific.
Finally, it is hypothesised that policy-making will tend to be linked to
patronage where, on the contrary, there is substantial distance between the
government and the supporting party and neither can impose its will on the other.
This situation characterises many constitutional presidential systems, since these
are based on separation of powers arrangements which are widely regarded as
resulting in a ‘congressional party’ being distinct and indeed autonomous from a
‘presidential party’3: the main way in which the executive can then endeavour to
see its initiatives accepted is through trade offs, many of which take place among
policies, but some of which also take place between policies and favours: in such
cases, the link can be very close, in part because neither of the partners can
exercise control over the other. A similar situation can also occur in parliamentary
government if the party system is rather inchoate and the executive lacks
therefore a secure majority, provided this executive has a relatively autonomous
power base: patronage may then be used as a means of obtaining the passage of
proposals which the government initiates4.
The rationale for these hypotheses needs to be presented in somewhat
greater detail if one is to assess the extent to which specific links exist between
appointment practices, patronage distribution, and policy-making; in many cases,
as we saw, actors may not need links between the three aspects of the
relationship to achieve their desired results, while, in other cases, they may too
weak to be able to establish a link. The rest of this paper is thus devoted to the
examination of the conditions under which links are likely to exist and to develop.
POLICY SUPPORT WITHOUT PARTICIPATION
Policy support without participation in the government is ostensibly special,
since, in a first phase at least, it is a relationship between the parties involved in
supporting the government rather than one between government and parties: the
decision to participate or not has obviously to take place before the government is
set up and in order to enable the government to be set up. Over time, however,
the government becomes involved, as it may well -indeed almost certainly will-
periodically negociate with the parties which give their support without
participating in order to ensure that that support remains firm.
The hypothesis is that support without participation occurs in limit-cases
only, since parties can normally be expected to want to maximise power as well
as influence policy-making influence. Indeed, while it has been claimed that it can
be rational for parties to abstain from joining the government, it has also to be
noted that it is rational for a party to want to achieve power in order to see to it
that the policies which it prefers are adopted: parties should therefore seek
ministerial positions because they favour certain policies5. Yet it has been shown
that there are cases of ‘power-shyness’, to use K. Strom’s imagery and this
‘power-shyness’ is reflected in at least a proportion of the very large number of
cases of minority governments6. These have not been studied systematically so
far, almost certainly because minority governments do not fit easily within any of
the theories accounting for coalitions7.
These situations of ‘power-shyness’ must be regarded as exceptional,
however. To begin with, not all cases of minority governments constitute real
instances of trade-offs between ministerial power and policy-making. First, many
minority governments are borderline majority, the government party having
obtained 45 percent or more of the seats in parliament8. Full discipline and total
collaboration of the other parties is required if the government is to be brought
down or its policies are to be rejected: in a multi-party system, this situation is
likely to be relatively rare; indeed, one might hypothesise that, the larger the
number of ‘non-governmental’ parties, the greater the probability that a minority
government will be able to survive. Second, small parties can be to an extent
blackmailed into giving support if they are ideologically placed in such a way that
they can only bring down the government or contribute to the defeat of its policies
by joining with parties which are ideologically very distant from them. Finally,
when the parties are small, there may well be behind-the-scenes deals involving
individual legislators: such cases resemble therefore those in which a link exists
between policies and patronage and which we shall examine later.
Thus, the only true cases of support without participation are those where
a party of substantial size sustains a government which comes markedly short of
a majority. These cases are mainly concentrated in Denmark and Norway,
although they have also occurred occasionally in Sweden, in Italy, and in some
Commonwealth countries (Britain, Canada). In Norway and Denmark, support
without participation can be regarded as rational, as K. Strom points out, since
the electoral costs of joining the government are not compensated by large
benefits: there is almost no patronage to be distributed and political behaviour is
so consensual that even opposition parties, let alone those which support the
government without joining it, share in the elaboration and development of
policies in and around parliament9. Little is therefore gained by participating in the
government.
The characteristics of the Norwegian and Danish systems analysed by K.
Strom are nonetheless exceptional, as the equation between costs and benefits is
usually different. Part of that difference stems from the underlying implication that
members of the party elite are not very eager to become ministers: this point
result from the conclusion, drawn by K. Strom for Norway, that there is little
parliamentary hierarchy in that country10; one might even go further and note that
ministers may be so harassed by a legislature which interferes with the activities
of the government (as the Danish legislature over European Community affairs)
that, in such a case, one might exercise more power as a member of the
legislature than as a member of the government. These remarks suggest that, the
more egalitarian the social and political elite, the less the personal aspects of
power are likely to weigh in these party decisions on participation.
It seems therefore fair to regard situations of support without participation
as limit-cases. They occur, first, in the context of small supporting parties,
especially if these are ill-placed on the ideological continuum to mix their votes
with those of the rest of the opposition. They also occur where a party gains little
from participation as much is decided consensually, patronage is limited, and the
political elite tends to be egalitarian. Finally, they occur where the party or parties
which support the government without joining it feel that they have primarily to be
concerned with their electoral future, the expectation being that the government
will not remain in office for very long: a similar game can be played by the
government party or parties as well, as these may blackmail the supporting
parties by threatening them to make them responsible for the collapse of the
government. Such a strategy can be played only where dissolution is freely in the
hands of the government and where ‘strong and stable government’ is widely
regarded as an important asset, these two points being characteristics of
Commonwealth countries, but not so much of the Scandinavian States11.
PARTY-LED LINKS:
a) Ministerial appointments leading to policy-making
At first sight, the most obvious way in which a link is forged between two
aspects of the relationship between government and supporting parties seems to
be that which connects appointments to the government to policy-making. These
links appear to follow logically from the very idea of representative government,
and especially of parliamentary government, modified and in a sense
implemented as it is through political parties. Since parties are now regarded with
justification as the institutional mechanisms which make it possible for the ‘will of
the people’ to shape governmental policies, a corollary seems to be that
governmental appointments should be made from within the parties with a view to
ensure that party proposals are implemented.
Other types of appointment arrangements seem to lead to a more indirect
and therefore less certain way of seeing to it that party proposals are
implemented: there is a danger that ministers might be more ‘independent-
minded’ as these, not being closely associated with the party, may feel less
bound to follow party views. There may of course be good reasons to make
appointments outside the parties: there may for instance be a need for technical
experts whom the party or parties concerned may not have. Some issues may be
so controversial or electorally so damaging that the party or parties supporting the
government may prefer to reject the poisoned gift, a situation which resembles, at
the level of given ministries, that of a party refusing power, not so much in this
case in order to achieve a desired policy result, but in order to allow a policy
through which is felt to be right and yet is unpopular. Such examples are -one
hopes- relatively rare: it seems a contrario that a party which wishes to see a
given policy adopted will want to appoint ministers who will loyally work for that
policy. In the first instance at least, what therefore seems in need of explanation
is the absence, rather than the presence of a specific link between ministerial
appointments and policy-making.
Many situations do not correspond to this straightforward scenario,
however. As a matter of fact, the scenario is fully in operation only when
government-building includes a degree of suspicion: for a party which appoints
ministers in order to ensure the adoption of its policies must have the political
muscle to appoint ministers: this is indeed why this type of link has to be regarded
as party-led; but the party must also feel that it needs to have loyal
representatives on the spot to see its policies implemented.
When, then, do these situations occur? They occur when parties have a
strong hold on at least part of the electorate and yet do not exercise enough
control over the government to be fully secure. This is why this type of
arrangement will not normally prevail when a united single party supports the
government or in the somewhat analogous case of support given by a dominant
single party, provided it is united. In such situations, the unity of the party and its
complete or near-complete hold on the government combine to make it
unnecessary for the party to appoint ministers with a view to achieving specific
sets of policies: the government is regarded as the party in power, though there
may be doubts about this complete transfer.
On the other hand, there will be worries about implementation when the
party has only a share in the government, as in coalitions or in single party
governments if that party is highly factionalised. There will also be worries in
single party systems, especially in those which have a ‘mobilising’ character, as it
is feared that technicians and bureaucrats in the government will have different
goals from those of the party; indeed, party officials will reinforce these worries as
their role might well disappear is party and government became identical. Thus in
these types of cases, a desire to control what the government is effectively doing
will tend to be widespread and this will tend to be done by appointing ministers
specifically for this purpose.
Coalitions without a truly dominant and united party, factionalised
governmental parties, and highly institutionalised single party systems are thus
the three types of situations in which a link may develop between appointments to
the government and policy elaboration and implementation. These situations
display some differences, however, as the link can be more or less close,
degrees of closeness being materialised by the extent to which the party
intervenes in the composition of the government. At one extreme, when suspicion
is low (or over matters in which the party has little interest), ministers may simply
represent their party in the government in a general manner: at the limit, the link
may be tenuous and the ministers may consider themselves as free agents. At
the other extreme, when worries are substantial (or over matters for which the
party cares strongly), the link is likely to be strong: appointments will then be
made for given ministries specifically to ensure that particular policies are carried
out according to party wishes.
Such situations may give rise to conflicts with other parties in the coalition
or within factionalised parties: the link between appointments and policies is then
no longer merely the result of an arrangement between government and
supporting parties; it becomes, just as the link which we analysed in the previous
section, an interparty or interfaction problem, while, in single party systems, the
need to appoint ‘non-party’ technicians may also give rise to conflicts. The
boundary dividing the situations in which a link exists between appointments and
policy-making and those where it does not is thus difficult to draw precisely and it
covers a large grey area where the links are rather weak.
b) Ministerial appointments leading to patronage
In party-led situations, the desire of parties to have a clear impact on
policies is often accompanied by the desire to have an impact on the distribution
of favours. The matter is difficult to analyse, however, not least because the facts
are often hard to discover: as a result, one might exaggerate as well as
underestimate the extent to which favours are distributed as well as remain
unsure as to exactly where the distribution of favours originates from.
Moreover, favours may well be distributed beyond the parties which belong
or even support the government. This may be in order to prevent the opposition
from voicing its concern about the very existence of these ‘spoils’; this may also
be because the government needs occasionally the support of the opposition
over some issues which are regarded as being ‘above politics’; this may be,
finally, because parties follow each other in the government and those who are in
power at a given point in time may not wish to see themselves left in the cold
when they come in turn to be in opposition.
The links between appointments and the distribution of patronage may
therefore not always be close. Yet they often also exist as parties more than
occasionally join the government with an eye to the favours which can be
distributed. This practice takes the form of a ‘colonisation’ of the ministries and of
the tentacles of these ministries in the public sector by members of the party of
the minister. The desire to ‘colonise’ and, once ‘colonisation’ has taken place, to
maintain the status quo is an important reason why parties wish to keep the same
ministries over a substantial period and insist on some of their own members
heading these ministries.
The very nature of these patronage arrangements suggests that they are
most likely to occur when spoils have to be divided, that is to say in coalition
governments: while not all coalitions are characterised by a high dose of
patronage, those in which the parties are very strong, have a large membership,
and indeed traditionally dominate the life of the citizens are likely to be those
where patronage is most likely to occur: Austria, Belgium, and Italy are, in
Western Europe, the clearest examples of this situation. Moreover, what applies
to coalitions applies also to factions within parties, as occurs in Belgium, Italy, or
Japan. Conversely, the link between appointments and patronage is less marked
in single party governments, except where the party is not united and except in
single party systems as, there, members of the government are often appointed
on the basis of complex patronage arrangements which, in Communist States at
least, were managed by those in charge of the nomenklatura. Where there is a
united single party in government and alternation in power, the ‘spoils system’, as
it was known in the United States in the nineteenth century, becomes dangerous
for the party which loses office: limitations tend therefore to be introduced both in
law and in fact. Patronage tends to become peripheral and appointments to the
government have little if anything to do with the mechanism.
GOVERNMENT-LED LINKS:
a) Appointments to the party leadership and governmental policy-making
It would seem prima facie less common for appointments at the top of the
party to take place at the behest of the government and in order to enable that
government to achieve specific policy aims. Yet there is probably at least some
general influence of the government on policy-making. This is obviously the case
when a party is set up by a leader already running the government: the party’s
role is to ensure that the policy aims of that leader and of the government are well
orchestrated; indeed, in the more authoritarian versions of this model, opposition
is limited or banned and the party is essentially a mechanism designed to
engineer popular support: top party appointments are therefore made by the
leader and the nominees are expected to support actively government policy.
A link thus exists between top party appointments and policy-making, but it
seems to be general rather than specific. The active involvement of the party in
the elaboration of governmental policy is not expected to be large in such
situations: yet, even there, more specific links may emerge, at least negatively, as
resignations and dismissals from the party leadership may take place when
particular policies are not being supported. Such developments are likely to occur
from time to time even in the most authoritarian single party systems dominated
by a leader, the only difference between tougher and milder authoritarian regimes
being the consequences of the dismissal for the persons concerned.
Specific links between top party appointments made at the behest of the
government and policy-making can also be found in pluralistic systems, if the
government has a true hold on the party. This might be thought to be rare, but it
occurs in two types of situations. First, there are presidential systems which are
based on a dominant party giving its disciplined support to the government: this
state of affairs may be regarded as unusual in truly liberal presidential systems,
since, in this case, parties tend to be autonomous from the executive12; but it can
occur if the system is only partly pluralistic, as in Mexico, or in the early period of
a liberal presidential system, as in Argentina in the 1980s, or if the political elite is
small, as in Costa Rica. Second, the link between top party appointments made
by the government and policy-making does also exist in two-party ‘adversarial’
parliamentary systems, such as those which prevail in many Commonwealth
countries and in Britain in particular, the strength of the government stemming in
these cases  from the transfer of leadership from the party to the government
which occurs when the party wins the election. This strength is reinforced by the
fact that political battles are fought on strict party lines. With some variations, a
similar situation obtains where a party dominates a coalition, as, in political terms,
that party tends to symbolise the government: for somewhat different reasons, the
Fifth Republic of France and the Federal German Republic provide examples of
this situation. The government may be able to play a large part in the
appointments of top party officials and these appointments may be directly related
to particular policies.
There are limits to the extent to which these links can develop in liberal
systems, however: ministers have usually more influence on the rank-and-file
leadership of the party than on the parliamentary leadership; pressure has also to
be gentler and more concealed in parties of the Left than in parties of the Right;
finally, as in authoritarian systems, specific links develop probably more in the
context of resignations and of dismissals than of ordinary appointments.
b) Trade-offs between policies and patronage
In some respects, the most evident -and perhaps the best documented-
links, at least as far as the United States are concerned, are those between
patronage and policy-making. They consist often of tit-for-tat arrangements by
which the government is able to obtain support for specific policies in exchange
for specific favours. The arrangements are government-led, as they occur at the
behest of the government, but, as they involve exchanges, they are also often
(though not always) specific.
For such an exchange situation to develop, there has to be relative
equality among the players: neither parties nor the government should be
overwhelmingly strong, but both should have a power base of their own as both
need to have something to exchange. This is why these situations are particularly
likely to emerge in constitutional presidential systems, in which the separation of
powers system gives autonomous bases both to the executive and to the parties
supporting that executive, at least in the legislature. Moreover, since, in these
systems, individual legislators have also more autonomy than they normally have
in parliamentary systems, there is also more need for patronage. Indeed,
patronage plays in these systems a somewhat different part from the one which it
plays where parties are strong and disciplined: in these last cases, patronage is a
means by which the discipline of the party is maintained, primarily for electoral
purposes; in constitutional presidential systems, as in the United States, but also
in Brazil, party discipline is weak and patronage is a mean of achieving policy
results. This situation does not obtain in all constitutional presidential systems, as
we saw: where it occurs exactly needs to be ascertained, though it seems
probable that, in truly liberal presidential systems, party discipline will tend to be
undermined and some scope for specific trade offs between patronage and
policy-making is likely to exist as a result.
Such trade offs may also occur between governments and parties if an
executive with a substantial amount of autonomy faces parties whose support
base is also independent. This can occur in some minority governments, indeed
not only between the government and the smaller parties, whether they
participate in the government or not, but between the government and the main
parties as well. As the cabinet has minority support only, it has to collect support
for its policies in ways which are not altogether very different from those which an
American president has to adopt. The trade offs between the government and the
supporting parties -whether in the government or not- may take place more
frequently among policies than between policies and favours; but favours may
well play a part. They may play a particularly large part for small parties which are
crucial for the governmental majority; but they may also play a part for other
parties, as this can be a way of compensating these for the fact that several of
their policies may not be adopted.
Yet these situations are relatively rare, even among minority governments,
as executive and legislature need to have autonomous power: such a condition is
not often fulfilled in fully parliamentary systems, since it is in the nature of these
systems that executive and legislature should be closely tied to each other.
Cases of this kind can therefore be found when the regime is imperfectly
parliamentary: the clearest current example is perhaps that of the Fifth Republic
of France, at least since the government lost its overall majority in 1986, as the
semi-presidential character of the system, even during the ‘cohabitation’ period,
helped to maintain the autonomy of the executive at a time when the potential
power of the legislature had increased. This example is unique, at least in
Western Europe: the Finnish, Austrian, or Portuguese presidents do not provide
the governments of their countries with a true autonomous base. Thus in the
parliamentary systems where patronage plays a significant part (Austria, Belgium,
Italy in particular), the parties retain the initiative on this aspect of government-
party relationships; there is no need for trade offs between government and
legislature over policy matters.
THE SPREAD OF SITUATIONS OF LINKAGE BETWEEN APPOINTMENTS,
PATRONAGE, AND POLICY-MAKING
Without the solid support of empirical evidence, even tentative conclusions
about the spread and extent of links between appointments, patronage, and
policy-making are difficult to draw. The circumstances in which these links can
take place are numerous and the conditions to be fulfilled are difficult to achieve.
These links emerge in an intermediate ‘zone’ between great party strength and
great governmental strength; but the boundaries of this zone are rather vague
and cannot therefore be determined without a detailed knowledge of the reality of
government-party relationships in the countries concerned. There are cases
where parties are strong enough to be able to control policies and distribute
favours without having to appoint ministers for this purpose, though, even in these
cases, a general link does exist between appointments, favours distributed, and
policies implemented. Among the limit-cases were probably the Communist single
party systems and some Continental coalition governments, such as that of
Austria, at least in the heyday of the ‘grand coalition’.
Most parties are not as strong or are not as strong all of the time: the
scope for links between appointments, on the one hand, and policy-making and
patronage, on the other, is therefore greater. Yet there may also be situations
when patronage takes place on a smaller scale, in part perhaps because
somewhat fewer demands are made on the public sector and in part because, if
the parties are disciplined or if the government majority is large, ministers may
neither need nor be expected to distribute favours on a large scale. The scope for
patronage is larger where parties have an indirect, but powerful grip, on the
executive, through the separation of powers established by the presidential
system. Although or indeed because they are autonomous, constitutional
presidents do not have the resources which truly powerful government have over
the parties which they control. These can so ‘domesticate’ the parties with which
they are connected that they can impose appointments and policies on what are
at the limit merely dependent organisations of the government. Between these all-
powerful governments and the autonomous, but limited constitutional presidents,
some strong executives may need and be able to make top party appointments
and exercise in this way some control over party involvement in policy-making:
British and Commonwealth examples show that this might be the case even in
parliamentary systems, but the precise extent of the links needs to be established
by close observation, as, at this point, too, the boundary is difficult to draw
between a puppet party and one on which influence has to be exercised by the
government.
Links exist between appointments and policy-making, between
appointments and patronage, between patronage and policy-making: but their
incidence must be compared with the bargains and exchanges which take place
within each of the three aspects of the relationships which develop between
governments and supporting parties. These links must also be weighed in terms
of the opportunities which many governments seem to have to shake gradually
the supervision which parties wish to exert on them. Parties may be involved in
ministerial appointments when the government is formed, but that government
usually retains some leeway in policy-making; it is indeed also sometimes
involved in party appointments as well, as for instance in Britain, France, or
Germany. Parties announce policies in their electoral programmes; these are
then more or less diligently followed by the governments which may also initiate
other policies. Thus the links may become gradually more tenuous. The ‘zone’ in
which links exist is broad, but rather vague: it may also increase or shrink over
time, thus adding to the complexity of what is still, in many respects, a terra
incognita  of government-party relationships.
Opportunity for specific and precise links to be forged between two aspects
of the government-party relationship cannot therefore be truly assessed before a
careful examination of the cases is undertaken. The examination will need to
discover the complex meanderings of the boundaries which pass between the
zones of great party strength and of great governmental strength, on the one
hand, and the zone where links tend to be numerous because each of the actors
needs to be able to lean on the other in order to achieve its goals. The links
between appointments, patronage, and policy-making flourish where pressure
rather than brute force prevails in relationships between governments and the
parties which support them. It is therefore not surprising that the zone should be
difficult to define; it is also likely to provide an important means of understanding
better how governments interact with the political parties which sustain their
efforts.
WHAT APPEAR TO BE THE MOST WIDELY EXPECTED RELATIONSHIPS
LINKING APPOINTMENT, PATRONAGE DISTRIBUTION, AND POLICY-
MAKING MECHANISMS IN GOVERNMENT-SUPPORTING PARTY
RELATIONSHIPS
The relationship between governments and supporting parties can take
three forms. It is therefore natural to ask: in what ways are these three forms
mainly expected to be linked? Does a privileged role of the parties in connection
with government appointments tend to be linked to a privileged role of the parties
in connection with policy-making? There seems to be at least some evidence that
such a link is often made: after all, parties often claim that they wish to take power
in order to be able to carry out certain policies. Yet we also know that this does
not always occur: many parties send their representatives to the government and
are frustrated because their desired policies are not implemented.
Meanwhile, a somewhat different view has also been put forward, in
particular by Strom (Comp. Pol. St., 1984: 211), as there appear to be
circumstances in which a trade-off takes place between ‘seeking power’ and
‘seeking influence’ or, in our terms, between government dependence on
appointments and government dependence on policy-making. The point is not so
much that cabinet appointments are sought entirely for their own sake, but that
they can be regarded as important in a somewhat vague manner, for instance to
protect ill-defined interests of the party in the future. Moreover, the distinction
between appointments and policy-making aspects helps to account for cases of
minority governments in parliamentary systems, in particular where they are
numerous, as in Scandinavia. Some supporting parties may well obtain that the
government depends on them for appointments, at least to an extent, while others
may prefer to ensure that the government depends on them for policy-making
only.
Two quite distinct hypotheses can be formulated on this basis and it
appears valuable that they should be tested. The first suggests what might be
called ‘reinforcement’ (of dependent government appointments by dependent
government policy-making, for instance); the second suggests what might be
called ‘compensation’, at least in part (also of dependent government
appointments for dependent government policy-making, for instance). These
hypotheses need to be extended to the other two ways in which governments and
supporting parties relate to each other, namely autonomy and supporting party
dependence. Overall we need therefore to find out whether, or to be more
accurate under what circumstances, the ‘reinforcement’ hypothesis or the
‘compensation’ hypothesis will tend to prevail with respect to a) autonomous, b)
supporting party-dependent, and c) government-dependent situations.
Such an analysis thus suggests a number of cases which need to be
investigated; it is partial, however, since it does not take into account the third
element of the government-supporting party relationships, namely patronage
distribution. This element is rarely referred to in analyses concerned with party
government, in part, as we know, because it is rather difficult to define patronage
precisely and to describe it accurately; indeed, as was pointed out earlier, there
are probably instances where patronage distribution is very low and may be
considered to be in practice insignificant. Yet patronage distribution has to be
taken into account since the analysis would not be complete otherwise, given that
it plays a large part in many countries.
What part patronage distribution plays in relation to appointments and to
policy-making needs to be clarified, however. Different hypotheses seem
permissible in this respect. In some cases, patronage distribution is likely to
increase the dependence of governments on parties further, as those parties may
be able to extract patronage distribution on top of appointments and policies; in
other cases, patronage is likely to constitute a form of compensation for
appointments and/or for policies which the supporting parties may otherwise have
opposed. Behind this distinction lies the point that patronage may be controlled by
the supporting parties in some cases, while, in others, it may remain controlled by
the government: consequently, the effect of the existence of patronage is likely to
be different depending on whether it is the government or the supporting party
which is dependent in the particular context; moreover, it may have in particular a
‘reinforcing’, or a ‘compensating’ character.
‘Reinforcement’ and ‘compensation’ relate to two possible strategies
(deliberate or not) with respect to the way in which the three components
combine in a given situation. We did notice, however, while analysing the nature
of the these components, that two of them, patronage distribution and policy-
making, could vary substantially in absolute magnitude and even, at least for
patronage distribution, be almost entirely absent. This suggests the existence of
another dimension of analysis, at any rate for these two components, which could
be described as that of the ‘level of development’ of each component. Normally
‘incompleteness’ can be expected to concern one component only (patronage
distribution or policy-making): an extreme and most peculiar case could be
characterised, however, by ‘incompleteness’ with respect to both patronage
distribution and policy-making: a government could stay in power only in order to
be in office. It would then do very little and even distribute no or almost no
patronage. Overall, however, the situations of ‘incompleteness’ with respect to
one component only are manifestly the most frequent; they give rise to vaying
levels of ‘reinforcement’ or of ‘compensation’.
We have thus moved somewhat towards being able to examine possible
differences in the manner in which the three components of government-
supporting party relationships appear to be linked; we have in particular begun to
discover the direction in which analyses can be conducted. We need now to look
at this direction a little more: we shall do so by examining first the situations in
which all three components ‘reinforce’ each other, then the circumstances in
which ‘compensation’ is likely to take place, and finally the cases in which the
relationship is ‘incomplete’ because one component is not represented or little
represented.
REINFORCEMENT
There is reinforcement when all three components, appointments,
patronage distribution, and policy-making, display the same tendency, namely
tend jointly towards autonomy, or towards government dependence on the
supporting parties, or towards supporting parties dependence on the government.
The clearest cases of reinforcement are those which are located in what can be
regarded as the areas of the three corners of the triangle, while compensation is
more likely to prevail, on the contrary, in cases which are located near the centre
of gravity of the triangle.
With respect to reinforcement, let us therefore look in succession at the
areas at the corners of the triangle which correspond to autonomy, government
dependence, and supporting party dependence. As far as autonomy is
concerned, we already know that it cannot be complete or that it is asymmetrical,
in that governments can be truly autonomous but supporting parties cannot.
Overall, these cases are likely to occur when governments and parties are neatly
separated. Perhaps the most normal situation is that in which the constitution or
the practice (with an elected president or an effective monarch) establishes an
autonomous base for the government. A less ‘normal’ case is that of an emerging
political system in which the relationship between government and supporting
parties is somewhat unclear: this could occur when the party system is
completely reconstructed, as happened in Eastern Europe after the fall of
communism, or even only partly reconstructed, for instance after the collapse of a
military regime. Yet another type of situation of this kind may be in the process of
occurring in some industrialised countries and in particular in the United States,
as a result of the increased distancing of parties from the executive in the political
system (a distance which has of course always existed to an extent). Thus neither
instances of party emergence nor instances of party distancing are so unreal that
the cases of full or relative ‘autonomy’ should be entirely overlooked.
What, then, should be the characteristics of all three components to
correspond truly to a situation of autonomy? What is required of appointments is
fairly clear and, indeed, clear on both sides: neither set of protagonists should
influence the other in this respect. Examples could be monarchical governments
of constitutional, but pre-parliamentary systems (e.g. contemporary Morocco),
some presidential governments (such as that of the United States), and perhaps
some ‘technical’ governments which are sometimes appointed in parliamentary
systems.
The distribution of patronage on an autonomous manner is more difficult to
envisage. It can none the less exist if it takes place at the same time in two
different ways. First, the government has to be in a position to distribute
patronage not to the parties, but to independent supporters, to notables for
instance, with a view to building support for itself where it is low or to diminishing
opposition where it is strong. Meanwhile, some patronage should also be given
directly to the parties for distribution by the parties themselves (perhaps including
parties not supporting the government) in a routine manner and on the basis of
rules which the government could not, in practice at least, really alter: legalised
party financing could be considered to be a limit-case of such a routine form of
patronage distribution.
Autonomous or near-autonomous policy-making is more complex to
describe. As policy-making often needs legislation and at least some financial
backing in order to be implemented, on the one hand, and, on the other, as the
implementation process entails the involvement of public servants and therefore
at least the passive concurrence of the government, governments and parties
seem unlikely to be truly autonomous from each other. Some cases of
governmental near-autonomy may exist, however, if, for instance, party influence
merely takes the form of suggestions made by one or a small number of party
members -including members of the legislature- and there is no direct intervention
of the parties as such. Conversely, while governments are unlikely to remain
passive when bills are initiated by the legislature, they may remain neutral, for
instance on conscience matters or on matters of private law; or the parties may
be profoundly divided within themselves and governments may have to refrain
from intervening. Here, too, this autonomy is more at the level of individual
legislators than at that of the supporting parties as such; but as there is at least
some influence of the parties on the legislators, one may consider these cases as
examples of near party autonomy. Thus, to exist generally, autonomy on policy-
making entails that there be fields in which each of the protagonists is recognised
as having, de facto , a monopoly of development.
Cases of full or near-autonomy in which there is true reinforcement are
likely to be rare, however, especially where parties are truly alive in the society.
They do exist, however, in the special circumstances of a strong executive,
supported by a strong monarch, faced with relatively strong parties in parliament:
historically, the German Empire at the end of the nineteenth century was such an
example. Moreover, even if the model corresponds to a somewhat extreme
situation, it is valuable as it helps to examine real-world situations and to ask: a)
in which type of parties and party systems do appointments tend to be
autonomous in both governments and supporting parties; b) when patronage is
so routinised that it does not involve the government at all; and c) under what
conditions and/or over what fields do policies tend to be developed relatively
autonomously by governments and by supporting parties, the fields in which
parties tend to be autonomous being almost certainly different from those in
which governments tend to be autonomous. At this last point, however, we may
come close to finding some compensating element, as there may be trade-offs
between one type of policy and another.
Government dependence on supporting parties may be regarded as being
the natural consequence of the theory of party government and indeed as the
direct expression of this theory. There is some ambivalence, however, about the
extent to which parties ‘should’ control governments, as it is felt, in classic
representative government, that the government ought to have some degree of
leadership capability (i.e. in effect autonomy) and that the government should be
responsible, not to the parties, which are regarded as being somewhat
‘unacceptable’ because they are ‘divisive’, but to parliament, which is supposed to
be composed of ‘independent’ legislators (hence the maintenance of the fiction
that all forms of ‘imperative mandate’ are wrong). This ambivalence suggests that
we should accept a substantial relaxation of the idea of dependence: this is why
we are referring here to an ‘area’ of dependence of governments on supporting
parties, as in the case of the autonomous ‘area’.
In terms of appointments, full government dependence on supporting
parties entails that a group entitled to act in the name of the party (the nominator)
chooses the ministers (the nominees) from within the party leadership and also
decides which positions these ministers will occupy in the government;
conversely the party leaders are not selected by the government from within the
government. The group entitled to act in the name of the party may be the
parliamentary party or it may be the party executive; it may indeed be a smaller
body, for instance a few advisers of the party secretary or party president.
Government dependence may not be as complete, however: the nominators from
the party leadership may for instance nominate ministers who do not belong to
this leadership. Moreover, while the ministers are selected by the party, the
specific positions held may be decided by the government head or by the
government collectively. Conversely, it may be that the government head
chooses the ministers, in which case the nominator is not the party, but these
ministers (the nominees) are all drawn from among an elite circle within the
supporting parties (for instance from among senior parliamentarians of the
parties).
At this point one comes to a situation which can be described as fusion, at
least at the time the appointments are made. This arises especially when the
head of the government is the party leader: there is then so to speak transfer from
the party to the government and it is difficult to speak of domination of the
government by the party, particularly since, over time, the ministers often acquire
independence. One important element of the assessment, however, is whether, in
the reality of the appointments, the head of the government is truly independent
or the party interferes somewhat in the appointments.
In terms of patronage, which must be substantial if we are considering
cases of genuine reinforcement, there must be dependence on the supporting
parties: these determine the content and the beneficiaries of this patronage: the
role of the government consists then simply in giving a formal basis to the
individual patronage decisions.
With respect to policy-making , the area of government dependence on
supporting parties has two aspects, positive and negative. The positive aspect
refers to the fact that the policies initiated and elaborated by the parties must be
implemented by the government; the negative aspect refers to the fact that
policies implemented should have been initiated and elaborated by the supporting
parties first; cases of governmental initiative should concern only matters which
are derivative or consequential on those which the supporting parties had initiated
and elaborated. A difficult borderline problem is that of whether a government
which is fully dependent on the supporting parties is able to act on its own
initiative in privileged fields such as foreign affairs and in particular when a crisis
occurs, for instance in foreign affairs but also over economic questions.
The area of supporting party dependence on governments appears
primarily to correspond to situations in which these parties have been set up or at
least markedly expanded by a government already in office or, more commonly,
by a leader who sees the need to consolidate support within the population and in
particular to mobilise electoral support. These cases concern primarily rather
authoritarian or ‘populist’ systems, but, as was pointed out earlier, some parties in
liberal countries can fall in this category: the Gaullist party is perhaps the clearest
example in postwar Western Europe.
With respect to appointments, the situation in a party dependent context is
the converse of the one which was found for government dependent cases.
Appointments within the government are made without reference to the parties;
appointments at the top of the parties are made by the government members and
in particular by the government head (nominators) among government members
(who are the nominees). The government leader may thus appoint some
ministers to top party positions. There is then party dependence as the ministers
are appointed to the party positions to ensure that the party fulfils its role of
mobilisation of the population in favour of the government and its leader.
Patronage can exist in a situation in which the supporting parties are
dependent on the government: we noticed earlier that there may be patronage
outside the framework of parties altogether and indeed that this patronage may
be used to undermine parties. Conversely, patronage may exist to establish new
parties and ensure that these remain controlled by the government. Admittedly,
the probable long-term effect of such a development will be to strengthen the
party gradually and will therefore end up in a reduction of the influence of the
government; but such an effect will take time to materialise and, in the intervening
period, the government can use the flow of patronage to ensure that it is
distributed to those to which it wants it to be given.
As for policy-making , it is indeed appreciably easier to conceptualise its
development in the context of dependent parties than in the context of autonomy
or of government dependence on supporting parties. The case of supporting
parties dependent on governments does indeed correspond to situations in which
parties are used by these governments primarily to mobilise or control the
population but where the origin of policies and consequently of statutes is to be
found among ministers, their entourage, and civil servants. In such a context, the
supporting parties are expected to pass the bills which are presented to the
legislature; these bills are likely to be accepted without amendments or with minor
changes only.
The supporting parties may be used by governments which need help in
the context of implementation, for instance to ensure that the policies are well
‘explained’. As with patronage, variations over time are nonetheless likely to
occur: supporting parties may, albeit slowly, move from a point of strict
‘obedience’ to one in which they begin to make suggestions on policy and are
thus less fully dependent.
Cases of supporting parties being dependent on governments are thus
fairly easy to describe: they are probably typically transitional in character; they
are therefore probably not really numerous as situations change gradually, but
substantially. Meanwhile, autonomous policy-making and patronage distribution
occur relatively rarely as well. Finally, government dependence on supporting
parties has to be conceived in a relatively broad manner and include cases in
which the concept of government ‘dependence’ is appreciably relaxed in relation
to all three components. As these conditions are being relaxed, however, one
begins also to move away somewhat from what can be regarded as true
‘reinforcement’ towards ‘compensation’, with trade-offs beginning to operate both
within each component and among the components of government-supporting
party relationships.
COMPENSATION
There is ‘compensation’ in government-supporting party relationships if
one side gains in one area while the other gains in another. The types of
compensation are manifestly very many; the level and extent of the compensation
mechanisms are also varied. As with cases of reinforcement, the situations which
are primarily considered here are those in which all three components figure
prominently, that is to say where both patronage distribution and policy-making
are at a high level. There can of course be compensation in situations in which
one component is markedly reduced or even absent: we will examine these as
examples of ‘incomplete’ relationships in the next section.
The basic distinction is that between compensation which occurs within
each component and that which occurs between components. Compensation
within each component means that appointments, patronage distribution, and/or
policy-making may to an extent be autonomous, to an extent government
dependent, and/or to an extent party dependent. For instance, appointments to
the government may be partly made under party influence and partly
autonomously; correspondingly, appointments to the party leadership may be
made partly under government influence and partly autonomously. The cases of
reciprocal influence at the appointment level occur frequently, and variations can
be monitored in terms of differences in the extent to which one side appears to be
more influential than the other. Reciprocal influence and trade-offs in policy-
making are possibly even more frequent; indeed, we already noted that examples
of government and supporting party autonomy in different fields could be
regarded as instances of trade-offs: the government is ‘allowed’ by the supporting
parties to be involved autonomously in a field (e.g. foreign affairs) on the
understanding that the supporting parties are autonomous in another field (e.g.
some aspects of social welfare). Such trade-offs occur perhaps even more
frequently between government-dependent and party-dependent policy
developments: the supporting parties come to accept without reservation some
policies which the government wishes to push forward on the understanding that
the government accepts to follow these parties on other policies. Indeed, as the
detailed analysis of policies can show, trade-offs of this kind occur as individual
policies are elaborated: often a clause is passed reluctantly in the legislature by
the MPs of the parties supporting the government on the condition that another
clause, wanted by these parties but which the government originally opposed, is
also accepted by the executive.
The second broad type of compensation is that which takes  place among
the components. The supporting parties press for ministerial appointments on the
understanding that the appointees will be fairly free to act in the way they wish
once in the government: the ‘more noble’ way of presenting this type of
arrangement is to state that the party ‘trusts’ its ‘representatives’ in the
government to do what is best for the party (and presumably for the country). This
‘trust’ may be genuine, in the sense that the party recognises that it does not
have the political credibility in the nation or the expertise to determine what can or
should be done; presumably the party guidelines are vague enough to allow for
considerable leeway: but the ‘trust’ may also be imposed on the party, if the
government leader or some minister is regarded as indispensable and he or she
can therefore act almost entirely as they please. These forms of ‘compensation’
must be monitored; they seem impressionistically to occur frequently.
Changes may occur over time in the character of the compensation. We
noted earlier that ministers may well move from being party dependent to
becoming autonomous. Such a change is likely to be resented by the party
leadership in the country or in the legislature: the climate of trust may alter and
give way to a climate of suspicion. The party may therefore wish to reassert its
influence and attempt to impose its views. The situation is then reversed: while
ministers have in effect become autonomous appointees by ceasing to be true
representatives of their party, the supporting party leaders may seek to establish
their influence on policy. These are of course not the only examples of
compensation in which supporting parties attempt to control policy developments
while leaving appointments relatively autonomous: more straightforward
examples are those cases in which the head of State has considerable scope in
making appointments to the government, but in which the appointees have
subsequently to take the views of the supporting parties into account in
developing their policies, perhaps because they feel that they have little support
in the nation in their own right and because, more concretely, the supporting
parties command a majority in the legislature.
Compensation naturally also occurs, and occurs frequently, between
patronage distribution and policy-making; but the trade-off probably takes place
primarily between supporting parties controlling patronage (a case of government
dependence on supporting parties) while (at least much) policy-making takes
place on the basis of government influence (a case of dependence of supporting
parties on the government). Supporting parties often display relatively little
interest for some aspects of public policy-making; at the local level at least, party
activists may well be satisfied if they see substantial amounts of patronage
coming their way. Favours to the party are then compensated for support
(probably mostly passive) given to some governmental policies.
Divisions among the supporting parties or indeed within the supporting
parties may also lead to compensation, especially if the government presides
over or initiates the trade-offs which occur. One supporting party (or a segment of
a supporting party) may thus obtain an advantage while another party (or
segment) obtains another. Most, if not all coalitions can indeed be regarded as
being based largely on compensation-building mechanisms of this kind, since one
party receives some advantages while another receives others. In many cases,
the discussion takes place directly among the parties; but in many cases, too, the
go-between and indeed initiator is the government.
Compensation may occur within each component, as when bargains are
struck between appointments, within the patronage distribution area, and/or within
the policy-making field. It may alternatively be based on an exchange involving
more than one component. Minority governments are typically built on
arrangements of this kind: the (external) support given by the parties not in the
government is obtained in terms of policy-making and/or in terms of patronage
distribution.
Compensation is thus one of the key mechanisms by which the
relationship between governments and supporting parties does take place. While
it is clearly impossible to measure, in the strict sense of the word, the extent to
which it occurs, this extent can be monitored in a broad manner both in general
and in two more specific ways. The levels at which it takes place can be
assessed on the basis of the distinctions which have been outlined and which
concern intra-component arrangements, inter-component arrangements, and
inter-party arrangements. One can also monitor the nature of the components
involved, namely whether appointments, patronage distribution, and/or policy-
making are concerned. If, however, one of these last two components is absent
or has very low salience in the bargains which are struck, this is probably
because the situation is not one in which compensation fully takes place, but one
in which there is an ‘incomplete relationship’ between governments and
supporting parties.
INCOMPLETE RELATIONSHIPS
The set of relationships between governments and supporting parties can
be described as incomplete if one of the three components is non-existent or
plays a rather limited part. Since one of the components, appointments, exists
necessarily as soon as governments and supporting parties exist, the question of
incompleteness arises in reality with respect to patronage distribution and to
policy-making only. There will always be a certain amount of policy-making in any
polity, admittedly; but the amount can vary markedly in quantity and, more
importantly, in significance. To be fully realistic, one should therefore define the
relationship between governments and supporting parties as incomplete if
patronage distribution is on a small scale and perhaps does not exist at all and/or
if policy-making is limited in quantity and is relatively insignificant. The most
extreme case would be that of a government which is content with very few and
trivial policies while there is no patronage at all.
Relationships of an incomplete character can theoretically result in
autonomy or near-autonomy between governments and supporting parties, in
government dependence on the supporting parties or in supporting party
dependence on the government. Yet the distribution of cases of incomplete
relationships does not appear to be random with respect to these three extreme
situations. For one needs to analyse the reasons why incomplete relationships
tend to occur. When incompleteness is the result of a low level of significant
policy-making, this is because significant policy-making is impossible or because
one of the partners in the relationship does not wish policy-making to be
significant. This last situation corresponds to the case of a government which
does not wish to act decisively because it might be forced to adopt policies which
it does not wish to adopt: a minority government in a parliamentary or a
presidential system might behave in this way, especially if the elections are to
take place in the relatively near-future. A name is typically given to this case in
the United States: the lame-duck situation.
There can also be a low salience of policy-making as a result of such
divisions among the actors that no effective action can be taken. This may well be
the result of the nature of a coalition, especially in a parliamentary system. In
such a case, the government might be prepared to act, but it might be prevented
from doing much because the coalition parties supporting the government cannot
agree.
Governments of this type may well distribute a high level of patronage;
indeed, patronage may be the cement which keeps the system working. There
can be autonomy if both appointments and patronage distribution take place in an
autonomous manner on both sides; there can be government dependence on the
supporting parties, if both appointments and patronage distribution take place on
the basis of the supporting parties taking the main decisions; or there can be a
mix of both and compensation of one by the other (probably autonomous
appointments compensated by patronage distribution taking place under party
dominance). Cases of this kind can be said to have a ‘party-patrimonial’
character: policies count little; the parties are involved in order to obtain a
personal advantage for their leaders (who receive government posts) and their
supporters (who receive patronage).
These cases cannot be based on parties dependent on governments, on
the contrary, except if the government is truly intrinsically inclined to achieve
nothing or very little and if the party has been set up precisely in order to obtain
this negative result. These are situations in which the government fights a
rearguard action against most forces in the society: this is unlikely to occur in a
liberal polity, not so much because no government might wish to adopt such a
line, but because pluralism and the openness of the system make it very difficult
for the government to do so. Taken together, the situations in which policy-
making is insignificant seem therefore to correspond to ends of regimes or ends
of long governmental periods, as has already been suggested. The nature of
these situations is such that it seems that they are essentially transitional.
The other type of incomplete relationship results from the absence or near-
absence of patronage distribution, while policy-making can be substantial. If the
case of the ‘party-patrimonial’ system suggests a high level of corruption in
political life, the absence of goals, and the end of a regime, the case of
incomplete relationship based on appointments and policy-making only can
perhaps best be described as being of a ‘party-programmatic’ character. The
government is in office in order to act on a national basis and little attention needs
to be paid to the idiosyncratic requests of segments of the party or of other bodies
supporting the government. Clearly, here too, the relationship can be based on
the two components reinforcing each other or compensating for each other: the
type of compensation which is most common, however, is the one in which
appointments are autonomous while policy-making is dependent on the
supporting parties. There can also be compensation between party dependence
on the government (for instance on some policies) and government dependence
on the supporting parties (for instance on some appointments and on other
policies).
As a matter of fact, in contrast with the ‘party-patrimonial’ types of
relationships, ‘party-programmatic’ types of relationships are unlikely to be based
on full or nearly full autonomy: if governments are relatively autonomous, they are
likely to want to develop a dependent party to increase their influence on the
society; stronger parties, on the other hand, are unlikely to be content with a
situation of autonomy which would let the government follow the direction it
wishes.
This is because the contrast between ‘party-patrimonial’ and ‘party-
programmatic’ situations extends to the kind of cases in which ‘party-
programmatic’ occur. While the ‘party-patrimonial’ cases correspond to the end of
a regime or of a government, ‘party-programmatic’ cases correspond to the
beginning of a regime or to its early phases. There seems to be, there too, an
element of instability, but this is more likely to be the result of policy
achievements, on the one hand, and of personnel fatigue, on the other: a ‘party-
programmatic’ arrangement may thus gradually develop into a ‘party patrimonial’
system unless efforts are made to maintain a relatively high level of policy-
making, even if some patronage is introduced.
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the detailed examination of the
relationship between governments and supporting parties with respect to the
three components which fashion that relationship, appointments, patronage
distribution, and policy-making. The first conclusion is that it is possible to
describe and assess, in very broad terms admittedly, the character of this
relationship. We can obtain some general findings: we can thus discover, to begin
with, whether the system of relationships is based on a reinforcing effect of the
three components or on compensation, or whether the relationship is in part
incomplete as one component, or even possibly two components, are missing or
are relatively unimportant. One can go somewhat further and, having described
the character of each component separately, pass some judgement on the way
these components combine, by stating whether what is achieved is nearly full
autonomy, nearly full government dependence on the supporting parties, nearly
full supporting party dependence on governments, or a combination which is only
a little more to the advantage of one of the protagonists than to that of the other.
A somewhat more detailed presentation of these assessments, based on the
reasoning of this paper, is presented in the questionnaire.
The second conclusion is that it appears possible and indeed fruitful to relate the
description of the relationships to a number of important independent political variables, as
had been suggested at the origin of the research; it may even be possible, as the
examination of ‘incomplete relationships’ suggests, to consider ways in which these
independent variables play a dynamic part over time. The organisation of the political
system, and in particular its presidential or parliamentary structure, the nature of the party
system with its consequential effect on the single party or coalition character of the
government, and the internal composition of the parties have been shown to play a part at
many points in this paper and therefore to constitute ‘causes’ of the development of
particular forms of relationships. With the help of the systematic description of empirical
situations, the analysis of government-supporting party relationships will therefore help to
provide major new insights in the reasons why governments and parties behave the way
they do.
NOTES
1. These were papers presented to the May 1991 Workshop of the Project on 'Governments and supporting
parties' under the titles 'Governments and Supporting Parties: Distinctions and Definitions', 'A Model for the
Analysis of Government-Party Relationships', and 'The political factors accounting for the relationship between
governments and the parties which support them'.
2. In a previous analysis, and in particular in the paper describing 'A Model for the Analysis of Government-
Party Relationships', it was suggested that these cases were examples of 'fusion' between party and
government: on reflection, it seems more to be a case of 'transfer' of the leadership of the party to that of the
government; meanwhile, the party has to reconstitute its leadership and it often tends to do so against the
government.
3. From the expression of the book by D. TRUMAN: The Congressional Party, New York, Wiley, (1959). This
development is particularly characteristic of the United States, but it occurs also more than occasionally in
Latin America; the fact that the majority of Congress may not differ from the presidential majority is of course
one of the arguments against the viability of presidential systems. See for instance J. LINZ: "The Perils of
Presidentialism", Journal of Democracy, Winter/1990, p. 51-69.
4. This case is different from that of the party which consciously trades off participation for specific policy
outcomes: here, the government has the initiative and offer favours in exchange for policies.
5. STROM, K.: "Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies", Comparative Political Studies, (17),
July/1984, p. 199-227.
6. STROM, K.: "Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia", Legislative Studies
Quarterly, (11), 4, November/1986, p. 588.
7. The analysis was first started by V. HERMAN and J. POPE: "Minority Governments in Western
Democracies", British Journal of Political Science vol. 3 (2), (Apr. 1973), p. 191-212. It was then taken up and
developed by K. STROM in the 1984 article mentioned in note 5.
8. According to K. Strom, (1984), 40 percent of the minority governments had 45 percent or more legislative
support (p. 203).
9. STROM, K.: (1986), p. 591.
10. STROM, K.: (1986), p. 592-596.
11. In Norway, there is no dissolution right whatsoever.
